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Section 303 of the United States (US) Senate's version of The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001 (S. 2507) stipulates fines up to $10,000 and imprisonment of no more than 3 years for the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. One significant intent of S. 2507 is to more fully
establish a rule of law covering such disclosure through the definitions of "authorized," "classified
information," and "officer or employee of the United States." However, the problem with S. 2507 is that
it focuses on definitions as opposed to real-world problems.
Individuals with so-called "authorized access" to classified information continue to exhibit a sense of
entitlement by leaking classified information to advance or impede policies and political careers and to
exhibit their own specialness. In fact, some of those who claim the greatest degree of being shocked and
appalled at leaking continue to finely hone their own leaking skills--even as a cover for their own leaking.
Individuals with so-called "authorized access" to classified information often are aware that much more
information is classified than needs to be. This state of affairs occurs courtesy of (1) hypervigilant
guardians who border on and go beyond the borders of the clinically paranoid; (2) over-compensators
for feelings of inferiority who approach grandiosity with the power to classify and to withhold
information and view people without access as the great unwashed; (3) malignant narcissists who
merely arrogate to themselves the quest for continual upgrades in being special; and (4) shame and
blame avoidant who operationalize avoiding by keeping information from the light of day. The
realization that overclassification exists facilitates a comfort level in not following the strictures of
protecting classified information.
Leaking and overclassification are significant enough in themselves as security problems--even if their
proponents usually do not intentionally seek to damage national security. However, these problems
become even more significant in that they can be exploited by allied, neutral, and adversary political and
intelligence operatives--directly through securing information and indirectly through "false flag
operations," wherein the intentional leaker or overclassification divulger becomes an unintentional
committer of treason. As well, both problems weaken the rule of law--the very construct that legislators
try and reinforce. And these problems can only noxiously interact with other problems--viz, intentional
espionage, sabotage, and treason. These last problems are further fueled by invalid models of human
behavior and motivation on the part of legislators. Finally, all problems are somewhat dependent on yet
other cognitions, emotions, and motivations of the legislators and their interactions with aspects of the
legislative system.
Thus, as opposed to focusing on semantics, the US Senate and the US House of Representatives as well
might do better to focus on political psychology. (See Guest, D.E. (1998). Is the psychological contract
worth taking seriously? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19, 649-664; Kleinmann, M. V., & Krise, E. F.
(1957). Mental illness and classified information. United States Armed Forces Medical Journal, 8, 10071016; Linn, L. (1973). Psychiatric factors in security screening. American Journal of Psychiatry, 130, 648652; O'Hair, H. D., Cody, M. J., & McLaughlin, Margaret L. (1981). Prepared lies, spontaneous lies,
Machiavellianism, and nonverbal communication. Human Communication Research, 7, 325-339; S. 2507,
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